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Quantum computers promise not only to outperform classical machines for certain important
tasks [1], but also to preserve privacy of computation. For example, the blind quantum
computing protocol [2, 3] enables secure delegated quantum computation, where a client can
protect the privacy of their data and algorithms from a quantum server assigned to run the
computation. However, this security comes at the expense of interaction: the client and server
must communicate after each step of the computation. Homomorphic encryption, on the
other hand, avoids this limitation. In this scenario, the server specifies the computation to be
performed, and the client provides only the input data, thus enabling secure non-interactive
computation [4–12]. Here we demonstrate a homomorphic-encrypted quantum random walk
using single-photon states and non-birefringent integrated optics. The client encrypts their
input state in the photons’ polarization degree of freedom, while the server performs the
computation using the path degree of freedom [13]. Our random walk computation can
be generalized, suggesting a promising route toward more general homomorphic encryption
protocols [14].
Secure delegated computing has been a longstanding research goal for both the classical and quantum
computation communities. The aim is to provide a client (Alice) access to remote computational
resources (Bob), while protecting the privacy of the data or the algorithm. In his seminal 2009
paper, Gentry described the first computationally secure, fully homomorphic encryption scheme for
classical computing [4]. Here, “computational security” means that the privacy guarantees of the
protocol are based on assumptions about an adversary’s computational capabilities; “fully” means
that any computation is possible. Blind quantum computation was as well introduced in 2009 [2, 3],
enabling a client to protect both their data and algorithm while running arbitrary computations on
a remote quantum computer. While blind quantum computation has the important advantage of
being information-theoretically secure — i.e., it does not rely on assumptions about the adversary’s
technological capabilities — its efficiency is limited by the need for interaction: Alice and Bob
must exchange classical information after each step of the computation. Quantum homomorphic
encryption removes the requirement of interactive computation but necessarily sacrifices either
security or computational power to achieve this, in accordance with a no-go theorem [15]: fully
homomorphic encryption is impossible if perfect privacy and non-exponential resource overhead
are required. Therefore, in the protocol implemented here, the requirements for (1) universal
computation and (2) perfect privacy are relaxed, based on the following two observations [13]. (1)
Certain classes of computations, such as quantum random walks, while only subsets of universal
quantum computation, are nevertheless of great interest [16–20]. (2) In any practical encryption
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2application perfect privacy is not required, as long as the maximum amount of information potentially
available to an attacker is sufficiently small.
Figure 1: Homomorphic encryption scheme. Alice prepares her input state by encoding the desired
photon-number state in the {H,V } basis and then encrypting it by applying a randomly chosen polarization
transformation on all photons (R). Bob performs the quantum computation on the encrypted state and
returns the photons to Alice. Alice undoes the previous transformation (R−1) and measures the photons in
the {H,V } basis, obtaining the outcome of the quantum computation.
In this experiment, we use single-photon qubit input states and an integrated-optics server
to demonstrate a quantum random walk using homomorphic-encrypted data, as proposed in [13].
Quantum random walks are typically implemented with either 0 or 1 photon in each input mode,
distributing n photons over m spatial modes. The protocol we implement here instead uses the
photons’ polarization to encode Alice’s input state for the quantum random walk, taking advantage
of the fact that orthogonally polarized photons do not interfere.
Thus, to implement an m-mode quantum random walk of n “walker” photons, rather than inputting
one photon into each of n modes and leaving the remainingm−n empty, we also inputm−n “dummy”
photons in the otherwise empty modes, with polarizations orthogonal to the n photons representing
the walkers. For example, an input state |Ψin〉 = |1, 0, 0, 0〉 for a traditional quantum random
walk (written in the occupation-number basis) would be encoded in this scheme as |Ψin,encoded〉 =
|H,V, V, V 〉, where |H〉 (|V 〉) represents horizontal (vertical) polarization. Measuring the output
photons in the {H,V } basis then yields the same result as the traditional occupation-number
quantum random walk. The purpose of this approach is to enable polarization encryption of Alice’s
input state: without knowing the basis in which Alice’s input is encoded, Bob can guess Alice’s
input state with only limited probability of success. To encrypt the input state Ψin, Alice randomly
chooses a key, a polarization state |X〉 taken from a set of d uniformly distributed points on the
Poincaré sphere, where d is the number of polarization basis choices available to her. To encrypt
her data, Alice rotates the polarizations of her qubits from |H〉 and |V 〉 to |X〉 and |X⊥〉 . Alice
sends this encrypted state to Bob, who performs the quantum random walk. Bob returns the output
photons to Alice, and she measures them in the {X,X⊥} basis, obtaining the result of the random
walk.
If Bob tried to decipher Alice’s encrypted state, the amount of information he could extract is
bounded by the Holevo quantity [22]. One straightforward attack Bob could employ is to randomly
choose a basis in which to measure all m photons: in fact, this attack is close to optimal, almost
saturating the Holevo bound. In the limit of large d and m, the success probability of this attack
is pB = 1/
√
pim [13]. The protocol also ensures the privacy of Bob’s algorithm. Since Alice only
knows the input and output states of the computation, the amount of information that she can
extract about Bob’s algorithm is proportional to that of a “black-box” function: the more queries
she is allowed to send, the more accurately she can guess the function. It is important to note that
2
3Figure 2: Experimental setup. A Ti:Sapphire laser is used to pump two non-linear β-barium borate
crystals, each probabilistically producing exactly one pair via type-II spontaneous parametric down conversion.
These photons are spectrally filtered and sent through polarizers to prepare a pure, separable four-photon
state. The four photons are coupled to single-mode fibers and synchronized in the delay stage, using
adjustable free-space delays (indicated by the double arrows). Using half-wave plates (HWPs) and quarter-
wave plates (QWPs) Alice can prepare arbitrary polarization states before sending the photons to Bob, who
will perform the random walk. After exiting Bob’s chip, the four output modes are collimated by a lens and
sent back to Alice. She uses the detection stage (HWP, QWP, polarizing beam splitter (PBS), single-photon
detector for each photon) to projectively measure the photons and recover the outcome of the random walk.
both Alice and Bob have an interest in performing a certain computation on a certain input state
exactly once, since both of them increasingly compromise the privacy of their respective secrets
with increasing number of repetitions of the computation. The no-go theorem [15] asserts that this
limitation is unavoidable.
In our experimental demonstration, Alice produces four photons using two spontaneous para-
metric down-conversion (SPDC) sources (see Appendix) and prepares them in a randomly chosen
polarization state using a polarizer, half-wave plate (HWP), and quarter-wave plate (QWP) for each
photon. Alice can create input states of any polarization with a fidelity of (99.5± 0.1)%, the main
source of error being imperfect polarization compensation of the single-mode fibers leading to the
chip. After preparing the encrypted input state, Alice sends the photons to Bob, who performs the
random walk.
In order for the scheme to work, Bob’s chip must implement the same unitary for the photons’ path
degree of freedom regardless of the input polarizations used — otherwise, the outcome would depend
on Alice’s choice of key. Although laser-written waveguides support propagation of all polarizations,
they typically have slightly different refractive indices for H and V polarizations (∆n ≈ 10−5),
making it a challenge to implement nontrivial polarization-independent path unitaries. To achieve
this, we used an annealing procedure to fabricate waveguides with birefringences ∆n < 10−6 (see
Appendix).
After the random walk, Bob returns the photons to Alice, who projects them in her previously
3
4Figure 3: Results of the encrypted random walk. We use two different devices to execute multiple
encrypted random walk computations (see Figure 5 for the equivalent results on the second device). (a) One
walker, (b) two walker, and (c) three walker are launched into different input modes alongside a corresponding
number of dummy photons. Here the output probabilities for three different input cases for two mutually
unbiased polarization bases are shown, alongside the values expected based on the reconstructed unitary
(see Appendix). The fidelities (Bhattacharyya distance [21]) between the expected and both measured
probabilities are (a) 0.99 ± 0.02, (b) 0.99 ± 0.02 and (c) 0.99 ± 0.03 and demonstrate the polarization
independence of the computation. More data and discussion of error analysis is provided in the Appendix.
chosen polarization basis using QWPs, HWPs, polarizing beam splitters (PBSs), and single-photon
detectors. To demonstrate the fidelity of the homomorphic-encrypted random walk we chose a
canonical set of two mutually unbiased polarization bases and performed random walks with one,
two, and three walkers using two different unitaries, each with m = 4 inputs and outputs. We used
{H,V } (parallel and orthogonal, respectively, to the chip surface) and {D,A} (|D〉 = 1√2 (|H〉+ |V 〉)
and |A〉 = 1√2 (|H〉 − |V 〉)). We characterized the unitary and compared the output probability
distributions with theoretical predictions, finding the mean overlap (Bhattacharyya distance [21])
between the predictions and results from all random walks to be (0.995± 0.014)% for the first device
(Fig. 5) and (0.986± 0.012)% for the second (see Appendix).
The security guarantees for Alice’s plain-text input state can be quantified in various ways. The
trace distance between the different input states that she can produce with four photons is 0.81
for Hamming distances 1 and 3 and 0.85 for Hamming distance 2 [23]. As a result, Bob cannot
perfectly distinguish any pair of possible plain-texts. Furthermore, the mutual information between
her plain-text string and Bob is bounded by the Holevo quantity to be no more than 1.96 bits
(see Appendix). To experimentally verify the security of Alice’s input, we implemented the attack
described above: Bob measures all of Alice’s four photons in a randomly chosen basis (here we choose
|H〉 for simplicity). Alice encrypts her plain text input-state (here we use |1, 1, 1, 1〉 ≡ |H,H,H,H〉)
4
5by choosing between d = 2, 3, 4, 6, 12 different linear polarization bases (keys). The probability of
Bob guessing Alice’s plain-text input-state can then be determined from the fraction of four-fold
coincidence detections Bob measures with polarization |H,H,H,H〉 (see Fig. 4). For m = 4, this
probability asymptotically approaches p = 0.27 for large d. Note that with current technology it is
already straightforward, in principle, to achieve arbitrarily large d, although this leads to only a
minor improvement: Alice could “auto-calibrate” her encrypting and decrypting operations by using
a single QWP, HWP set to both prepare and measure all of her photons’ polarizations. Improving
Alice’s security requires increasing m (for example, pB = 0.01 for m = 3500). Additionally, Alice
can reduce the Holevo information by a factor of 2 by selecting keys from the whole Poincaré sphere,
rather than constraining herself to linear polarizations.
0 10 20 30 40 50
Number of Modes
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
d=2
d=3
d=4
d=6
d=12
d=
Figure 4: Privacy of Alice’s plain text input state. In our homomorphic encryption scheme, a
random attack is optimal when Alice encrypts with all polarizations, and nearly optimal when she encrypts
with only linear polarizations: Bob measures all photons in a randomly chosen basis. Alice’s security depends
on the number of polarization bases (keys) d she can choose from, and the input modes m. In our case
m = 4 and we measure the probability of Bob guessing the correct state for d = 2, 3, 4, 6, 12 (black dots,
error bars lie within the points). The blue dashed line shows the asymptotic behaviour for an infinite key
number. All lines are theoretical upper bounds (see Appendix).
We have demonstrated homomorphic-encrypted quantum random walks of up to three walkers in four
modes. Our photonic system’s specially engineered features allowed us to encrypt Alice’s plain-text
input state in polarization, while performing computations using the path degree of freedom. The
security of Alice’s plain-text input is necessarily limited by the number of modes used, i.e. by
the number of available photons — however, the continuing advances in photon-source technology
will enable similar demonstrations using more modes in the future. Further improvements can
be made by encrypting in a different photonic degree of freedom with more than two levels. For
example, orbital angular momentum enables, in principle, arbitrarily high-dimensional encoding,
and transmission of such states in optical fiber has already been demonstrated [24]. Using an a-level
degree of freedom for encoding, instead of polarization, the amount of hidden information can be
improved from log2(m) scaling to m log2(a/m) +m(log(2))−1 [14]. As we have shown here, although
perfect security for universal computation (without exponential resource overhead) is forbidden [15],
relaxing these conditions can enable interesting applications. Determining the ideal mix of security,
performance, and generality of the computation remains an active topic of research.
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9Appendix
Experimental Setup.
Our experimental setup is shown in Figure 2. We generate all four photons using degenerate,
noncollinear type-II spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC). Two separate 2 mm-thick
β-barium borate (BBO) crystals are pumped by a Ti:Sapphire laser (Coherent Chameleon Ultra
II, 789 nm, 150 fs duration, 80 MHz repetition rate, 3.6 W average power) which has been frequency
doubled to 394.5 nm using second harmonic generation in a 5 mm-thick lithium triborate (LBO)
crystal. The photons emitted by the crystals pass through 1 mm-thick BBO crystals of the same cut
angle as the SPDC crystals to compensate for spatial and temporal walk-off before being spectrally
filtered by 3 nm-bandwidth spectral filters centered at 789 nm, and spatially filtered by single-mode
optical fibers (SMFs) of type Nufern 780-HP. All photons pass through polarizers to create pure
polarization states and then through a half-wave-plate (HWP) and quarter-wave-plate (QWP) to
enable the creation of arbitrary polarizations states. The QWP and HWP were rotated using highly
precise motorized rotation mounts with a precision of 0.02◦ . Adjustable free-space delay lines are
used to synchronize the photons such that they all arrive at the chip within their coherence time of
approximately 300 fs. The photons are coupled to the chip using a 127 µm-pitch v-groove array of
Nufern 780-HP fibers. The (5× 5) µm fiber mode-field has a high overlap with the mode-field of the
waveguides, which are of equivalent size. On the output facet of the chip the photons are collimated
using a lens and sent to the detection stage. Using a QWP, HWP and a polarizing-beam-splitter
(PBS) and avalanche photodiodes (APDs) the photons can be detected in any desired polarization
basis. The overall transmission (from fiber in-coupling to APDs) was measured to be (50± 5)%.
Waveguide Details.
The four-mode optical circuit for our quantum random walk was fabricated by direct laser writing in
Corning Eagle-XG borosilicate glass. The laser source we employed was a Yb:KYW cavity-dumped
oscillator at 1030 nm wavelength, emitting pulses of 300 fs duration, and at 1 MHz repetition rate.
The laser beam was focused into the bulk of the glass substrate using a 50x, 0.6 NA microscope
objective, and the inscription of the optical waveguides was performed by translating the glass (with
respect to the objective’s focus), with a computer-controlled three-axis Aerotech FiberGlide 3D series
stage, at a tangential velocity of 40 mm/s. The waveguides were inscribed at a depth of 170µm,
with 270 mW of laser power, using a multiple irradiation approach (5-times per waveguide), and
then they were annealed. The thermal processing makes the optical circuits polarization insensitive
[25], and helps reduce the optical losses due to the waveguide bends [26]. Overall, we were able to
achieve transmissivities of up to (52.6± 3)% for 22 mm long devices, with bending radii of 90 mm.
We fabricated several different photonic circuits with the geometry shown in Figure 2, and tuned the
power splitting of the directional couplers by modifying their interaction length. We reconstructed
the unitary transformations implemented by the two devices of choice (see Appendix), using methods
demonstrated in [27, 28] and subsequent numerical optimization.
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Holevo Information.
To analyze the amount of information Bob can gain from a single copy of Alice’s state we calculate
the Holevo quantity
χ(m) = −Tr(ρ log2 ρ) +
1
2m
2m−1∑
i=0
Tr(ρi log2 ρi),
where ρ = 12m
∑2m
i=1 ρi and ρi =
∑d−1
k=0
⊗m
j=1R(kpid ) |Pij〉 × 〈Pij |R(−kpid ) and |Pij〉 = |H〉 when the
jth bit of i is 0, otherwise |Pij〉 = |V 〉 [13]. In our experiment m = 4 and 12, yielding
χ(4) = 1.9694 .
Note that for elliptical polarization encodings the Holevo information is halved but the scaling in m
remains the same (see Appendix).
Bob’s random attack.
The simplest attack is realized by measuring all photons in the same basis as described in [13]. The
probability of inferring the correct state is then given by
p = 1
d
d−1∑
j=0
cos2m
(
jpi
d
)
(1)
with the number of spatial modes m and the number of possible polarization bases d.
Measurement errors.
The main drawback of downconversion-sources is that their emission is probabilistic. This is especially
problematic for our experiment, where the probability of simultaneously generating exactly one
pair in each crystal, as desired, equals the probability of generating exactly two pairs in one of the
crystals. In our setup, we circumvented this problem by making the pairs from the two sources
distinguishable by polarization. For input states in which one photon has polarization orthogonal to
that of the other three, the input polarization could be set to either |H,H〉 or |V, V 〉 for source 1, as
needed, and |H,V 〉 for source 2: then Alice’s final polarization measurement would distinguish the
events of interest from those in which one crystal created all four photons. We can also deal with
input states with two |H〉 photons and two |V 〉 photons by having sources 1 and 2 produce |H,H〉
and |V, V 〉, respectively, and rewiring the input channels to the chip as needed. Double-pair emission
for input states |H,H,H,H〉 and |V, V, V, V 〉 cannot be dealt with this way, but these states are not
of interest for a quantum random walk.
Having suppressed errors from double-pair emission, we must now consider triple-pair emission.
The noise contributed by these events is on the order of the sources’ per-pulse emission probability,
which is 0.14%.
To quantify the spectral distinguishability of our photons, we measured Hong-Ou-Mandel
interference visibility for all four combinations of signal and idler from source 1 with signal and
10
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idler from source 2. After subtracting statistically expected higher-order noise, we measured the
visibilities to be
V = Cmax − Cmin
Cmax
= 0.88± 0.05, (2)
and V = 0.77± 0.05 without subtracting higher order noise. For more discussion of experimental
errors in quantum random walks, see [29]. We assumed Poissonian error for all single-photon
detection rates, so that for N detections, we assume an error of  =
√
N .
The error in the reconstructed unitary propagates from errors in our intensity measurements,
which are in turn used to infer amplitudes and phases. Here we are able to limit the error on the
inferred transmission amplitudes and phases to 1% and 50 mrad, respectively. The discrepancy in
error-bar size for the various output possibilities stems from the nature of the unitary: phase errors
can lead to large changes in some output probabilities, while having hardly any effect in others.
Unitary of the devices
Here we present the two unitaries used for the random walk experiments.
U1 =

0.74 0.38 0.39 0.4
0.37 −0.34− 0.71i −0.17 + 0.31i −0.18 + 0.31i
0.38 −0.15 + 0.29i −0.81 + 0.06i 0.18 + 0.25i
0.42 −0.17 + 0.32i 0.2 + 0.18i −0.78 + 0.08i

U2 =

0.64 0.44 0.37 0.54
0.44 −0.33− 0.65i −0.14 + 0.26i −0.15 + 0.41i
0.37 −0.14 + 0.26i −0.4 + 0.51i −0.15− 0.57i
0.54 −0.15 + 0.41i −0.15− 0.57i −0.41 + 0.02i

Holevo information for encryption using random rotations over the Poincare
sphere
Any operation on the Poincare sphere is a SU(2) transformation for which an arbitrary element can
be expressed as
R(α, β, γ) = Rz(α)Ry(β)Rz(γ) , (3)
where Rz(α) = e−iασz , Ry(β) = e−iβσy , and
σz =
1
2
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, σy =
1
2
(
0 −i
i 0
)
. (4)
Then explicitly in the basis {|H〉 , |V 〉},
R(α, β, α) =
 cos(β2) e− i2 (α+γ) − sin(β2) e− i2 (α−γ)
sin
(
β
2
)
e
i
2 (α−γ) cos
(
β
2
)
e
i
2 (α+γ)
 . (5)
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Figure 5: Random Walk Results for device 2. a) One photon is H(A) polarized and launched into
one of the four input modes of the chip while three V (D) polarized photons are send to the other inputs
to mask the true input state. The graphs show the probability of finding the H(A) polarized photon in
the different output modes. b) Two H(A) polarized photons are launched into the modes 1/2 alongside
V (D) polarized photons in the other modes. The probabilities to find the two photons in different output
modes are shown. c) Three H(A) photons are launched into the modes 2,3,4 alongside a V (D) photon in the
remaining mode. The fidelities (Bhattacharyya distance) between the expected and measured probabilities
are (a) 0.99± 0.02, (b) 0.99± 0.02 and (c) 0.96± 0.026.
The Haar measure on SU(2) is
dµ(α, β, γ) = 116pi2 sin(β)dβdαdγ . (6)
So, to sample uniformly from SU(2) on the Poincare sphere, we have to pick α, γ ∈ [0, 2pi), and
ξ ∈ [0, 1] and compute β = 2 sin−1(√ξ) (see Section 2.3 in essay “How to generate a random unitary
matrix" by Maris Ozols).
Encryption
Alice selects secret keys k1, k2, and k3 at random uniformly, where ki ∈ [0, di − 1]. She performs a
mode-by-mode random polarization on her input state from the Poincare defined by the (Euler)
angles of the transformation:
α = 2pik1
d1
, γ = 2pik3
d3
, β = 2 sin−1(
√
ξ) for ξ = k2
d2 − 1 . (7)
If Alice’s m-mode input state is |ψ〉, then she implements R (α, β, γ)⊗m |ψ〉. As in Rohde et al.,
each mode of Alice input state is either |H〉 for logical 0, or |V 〉 for logical 1. Let us denote Alice’s
encoded bit-string by x. After encryption, Alice sends her encrypted state to Bob for processing.
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Since Bob does not know Alice’s secret keys, he sees a superposition of all the states corresponding
to the different possible secret keys,
ρx =
1
d1d2d3
d1−1∑
k1=0
d2−1∑
k2=0
d3−1∑
k3=0
m⊗
j=1
R(α, β, γ) |Px,j〉 〈Px,j |R(−α,−β,−γ) , (8)
where |Px,j〉 = |H〉 when the jth bit of x is 0, and |Px,j〉 = |V 〉 when the jth bit of x is 1.
Let ρ = 12m
∑
x∈Zm2 ρx. Then, the Holevo quantity is given by
χ
(
ρx, px =
1
2m
)
= S (ρ)−
∑
x∈Zm2
1
2mS (ρx) , (9)
where S(σ) is the von Neumann entropy of density matrix σ. As in Rohde et al., the first term is
equal to m because
{⊗m
j=1 |Px,j〉 , x ∈ Zms
}
forms a complete set of basis. Owing to the invariance
of the von Neumann entropy under unitary transformation, we have
S(ρx) = S(ρ0) . (10)
Hence, it suffices to find the eigenvalues of ρ0. First, we observe that
R(α, β, γ) |H〉⊗m =
(
cos
(
β
2
)
e−
i
2 (α+γ) |H〉 − sin
(
β
2
)
e−
i
2 (α−γ) |V 〉
)
, (11)
where e− i2α is a global phase factor. Let |aV 〉m denote a state that is the symmetric sum of all
states with a qubits in the |V 〉 state. So ρ0 simplifies to
ρ0 =
1
d2d3
d2−1∑
k2=0
d3−1∑
k3=0
m⊗
j=1
(
cos
(
β
2
)
e−
i
2γ |H〉 − sin
(
β
2
)
e
i
2γ |V 〉
)(
cos
(
β
2
)
e
i
2γ 〈H| − sin
(
β
2
)
e−
i
2γ 〈V |
)
(12)
= 1
d2d3
d2−1∑
k2=0
d3−1∑
k3=0
m∑
a,b=0
√(
m
a
)(
m
b
)(
cos
(
β
2
)
e−
i
2γ
)m−a(
− sin
(
β
2
)
e
i
2γ
)a
(13)
× |aV 〉m m 〈bV |
(
cos
(
β
2
)
e
i
2γ
)m−b(
− sin
(
β
2
)
e−
i
2γ
)b
. (14)
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The sum over k3 is
1
d3
d3−1∑
k3=0
exp
(
− i2γ(m− a− a− (m− b) + b)
)
(15)
= 1
d3
d3−1∑
k3=0
exp
(
− i2γ(−2a+ 2b)
)
(16)
= 1
d3
d3−1∑
k3=0
exp (−iγ(−a+ b)) (17)
= 1
d3
d3−1∑
k3=0
exp
(
−2piik3
d3
(−a+ b)
)
(18)
= δa,b . (19)
As such, eq. (14) simplifies to
ρ0 =
1
d2
m∑
a=0
d2−1∑
k2=0
(
m
a
)(
cos2
(
β
2
))m−a(
sin2
(
β
2
))a
|aV 〉m m 〈aV | (20)
= 1
d2
m∑
a=0
d2−1∑
k2=0
(
m
a
)(
d2 − 1− k2
d2 − 1
)m−a(
k2
d2 − 1
)a
|aV 〉m m 〈aV | . (21)
In the limit of large d2, we can approximate the sum over k2 as an integral, i.e.
1
d2
d2−1∑
k2=0
(
1− k2
d2 − 1
)m−a(
k2
d2 − 1
)a
→
∫ 1
0
dx(1− x)m−axa . (22)
Using an identity∫ 1
0
tx−1(1− t)y−1dt = Γ(x)Γ(y)Γ(x+ y) , (23)
we have∫ 1
0
dx(1− x)m−axa =Γ(a+ 1)Γ(m− a+ 1)Γ(m+ 2) (24)
=a!(m− a)!(m+ 1)! . (25)
Putting all this together, we have
lim
d2→∞
ρx =
m∑
a=0
(
m
a
)
a!(m− a)!
(m+ 1)! |aV 〉m m 〈aV | (26)
= 1
m+ 1
m∑
a=0
|aV 〉m m 〈aV | . (27)
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When d2 → ∞, ρ0 is completely mixed over the symmetrized basis states |aV 〉m and its entropy,
which represents the number of bits hidden from Bob, is log2(m+ 1). For linear polarization the
entropy of the encrypted all-zero bit string is 12 log2(piem/2). Hence, the randomization over the
whole Poincare sphere decreases the Holevo information by a constant factor, but the scaling in m
remains O(log2(m)).
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